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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION,
Defendant / Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 20081054-SC

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff/ Respondent.
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF / RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The court of appeals issued its decision in this action on November 28, 2008.
Dep't of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp.. 2008 UT App 426, 198 P.3d 1003
(Addendum A). A timely petition for a writ of certiorari was filed by the defendant. This
Court granted that petition, limited to two questions stated by the Court. This Court has
jurisdiction to hear this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a) (West
2009).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Certiorari was granted to consider the following two questions.
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in its construction and application of
relevant precedent to Petitioner's claim for severance damages for loss of view.
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2. Whether damages for loss of view may be segregated from overall severance
damages.
In its order of June 23,2010, this Court requested "the parties to brief the question
of whether Ivers v. Utah Department of Transportation, 154 P.3d 802 (UT 2007) should
be overruled on constitutional grounds."
STANDARD OF REVIEW: On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the
court of appeals for correctness, ceding no deference to the court of appeals. State v.
Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 11, 103 P.3d 699.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES
Constitution of Utah, Art. 1, § 22 [Private property for public usej
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511 (West 2009). Compensation and damages — How
assessed.
The court, jury, or referee shall hear any legal evidence offered by any of the parties to
the proceedings, and determine and assess:
(1) (a) the value of the property sought to be condemned and all improvements
pertaining to the realty;
(b) the value of each and every separate estate or interest in the property; and
(c) if it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and of each estate or
interest in each shall be separately assessed;
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel,
the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by reason of its
severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the construction of the
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff;
(3) if the property, though no part of it is taken, will be damaged by the construction of
the proposed improvement, and the amount of the damages;
(4) separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned, and each estate or
interest in it, will be benefitted, if at all, by the construction of the improvement proposed
2

by the plaintiff. If the benefit is equal to the damages assessed under Subsection (2), the
owner of the parcel shall be allowed no compensation except the value of the portion
taken; but if the benefit is less than the damages assessed, the former shall be deducted
from the latter, and the remainder shall be the only damages allowed in addition to the
value of the portion taken;
(5) if the property sought to be condemned consists of water rights or part of a water
delivery system or both, and the taking will cause present or future damage to or
impairment of the water delivery system not being taken, including impairment of the
system's carrying capacity, an amount to compensate for the damage or impairment;
(6) if land on which crops are growing at the time of service of summons is sought to
be condemned, the value that those crops would have had after being harvested, taking
into account the expenses that would have been incurred cultivating and harvesting the
crops; and
(7) as far as practicable compensation shall be assessed for each source of damages
separately.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from an interlocutory order that granted certain motions in limine
filed by UDOT. R. 862-67, a copy is attached as Addendum B. Defendant filed its
petition for an interlocutory appeal on January 16, 2008. R. 875. This action came within
the original jurisdiction of this Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) (West
2009). On January 17,2008, this Court transferred the petition to the Utah Court of
Appeals pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. R. 877. On
January 30, 2008, that court granted the defendant's petition as to "[w]hether the trial
court erred in excluding evidence of severance damages based on loss of view from the
remaining property." R. 895.
On November 28, 2008, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's order.
Dept. of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp.. 2008 UT App 426, 198 P.3d 1003. The
court held that the appurtenant easement of view only applied to a public road that
3

abutted the property in question. Id. at ^3. The court also rejected the defendant's claim
that it should be compensated for an alleged loss of visibility from 1-15. Id at f 5 n.2.
Defendant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with this Court that was granted.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The facts concerning the location of Admiral Beverage's property and how it
relates to 1-15 are taken from Judge Roth's Memorandum Decision and Order of October
31,2005. R. 492-502 (a copy is attached hereto as Addendum A). The district court
found that the facts were not "disputed in any material way." R. 493. Defendant has
never claimed that there was a material issue of fact.
Admiral Beverage owns two adjacent lots that are west of 1-15 in Salt Lake
County. The property abuts the west side of 500 West, a surface street owned by Salt
Lake City, which acts as a frontage road in that area. 500 West runs between Admiral
Beverage's property and 1-15. R. 664 (map of Admiral Beverage's property showing its
relationship with 1-15 and the portions to be condemned - a copy is attached as
Addendum C).
In connection with the 1-15 reconstruction project, the west side of the
freeway in that area was moved closer to the Admiral lots, requiring that the
500 West frontage road also be moved further to the west and onto the east
side of Admiral's property, resulting in the condemnation of what are now
identified as parcels 109 and 110, which are the subject of these
consolidated cases.
R. 493.
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The parcels of land taken from Admiral Beverage for the project were used for the
reconstruction of 500 West, a street owned by Salt Lake City. As part of the
reconstruction, 500 West was moved farther west and partially onto Admiral Beverage's
property. The changes were made by UDOT. None of the defendant's property was used
for the remodeled 1-15. R. 494. While not mentioned by Judge Roth, it is undisputed that
both before and after the reconstruction of 1-15 access to Admiral Beverage's property
was gained by use of 500 West. R. 657.
Admiral Beverage's interlocutory appeal challenged the district court's orders
granting UDOT's three motions in limine. UDOT's first motion asked that the defendant
be precluded from presenting evidence at trial of severance damages caused by a loss of
visibility into the noncondemned portions of the property from 1-15. R. 151-63. UDOT's
second motion challenged the appraisal prepared by Jerry Webber because it included the
same loss-of-visibility damages excluded by the district court's prior order. R. 727-35.
Defendant acknowledges that Mr. Webber said he was unable to separate damages caused
from loss of view (out) from damages caused by loss of visibility (in). R. 774; Brief of
Appellant at 15-16. UDOT's third motion asked that severance damages claimed to be
caused by changes to a road or freeway that did not abut the defendant's property be
excluded. R. 656-64.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Admiral Beverage argues that the fair market value of its property has been
diminished by the loss of visibility caused by the reconstruction of 1-15. It claims that a
5

state constitutional taking has occurred and it should be compensated for this loss of
visibility. Supplemental Brief of Defendant / Petitioner at 31-46. But to state a takings
claim, defendant must have a protectable property interest.
Loss of view damages are caused by obstructions that block the view out from that
portion of the property that was not condemned. Loss of visibility damages are caused by
obstructions that block the view into the noncondemned portion of the property from a
roadway or highway.
Utah has never recognized a protected property interest in a loss of visibility. Loss
of visibility is a claim for lost business profits caused by a change in the traffic flow or in
the ability of traffic to see into the landowner's property. Ivers v. Utah Dep't of Transp..
2007 UT 19,154 P.3d 802, followed the prior decisions of this Court in holding that no
such protected property interest existed.
This Court has expressly held that Utah does not recognize a damage claim based
on a property's loss of visibility (in) from a roadway. Utah law has repeatedly rejected
efforts to create a property right in the flow of traffic on the public roads past a certain
piece of land.
But Ivers did err by departing from this Court's prior decisions in creating a new
property right for loss of view that had not previously existed. Defendant's property does
not abut 1-15. The land is on the west side of 500 West, which it abuts, while 1-15 is to
the east of 500 West. The appurtenant easement of view (out) is a property right that
attaches only to the abutting roadway (500 West), not to other property or roadways.
6

Ivers extended the property right of a loss of view to include not only damages
caused by construction on the condemned piece of property, but to obstructions that are
built on other parcels of property in which the claimant never had a property interest.
Plaintiff asks this Court to reverse this part of Ivers and reaffirm the prior law of Utah.
ARGUMENT
Whether severance damages are sought under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah
Constitution or Utah's statutes, the result is the same. This Court has used the same
definition for "damages" under the takings clause of the state constitution and the eminent
domain statutes. Coleman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 626 (Utah 1990); Bd. of
Educ. v. Croft. 373 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1962). In relation to alleged damages suffered
by property that was not actually condemned, such damages are limited to those available
at common law or that involve some physical injury to the property.
Damages to land, by the construction of a public or industrial
improvement, though no part thereof is taken as provided for under 7834-10(3),... is limited to injuries that would be actionable at common law,
or where there has been some physical disturbance of a right, either public
or private, which the owner enjoys in connection with his property and
which gives it additional value, and which causes him to sustain a special
damage with respect to his property in excess of that sustained by the public
generally.
Croft, 373 P.2d at 699 (footnote omitted) (rejecting claim for damages to remaining
property allegedly caused by construction of school where the school was not built on that
portion of plaintiffs' land that was condemned). See also Coleman, 795 P.2d at 626-627;
Harold Selman, Inc. v. Box Elder County, 2009 UT App 99, ]99 208 P.3d 535 (the takings
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provision of the Utah Constitution does not apply unless the claimant possesses a
protectable interest in the property). This Court has used common law principles in
interpreting the eminent domain statutes.
Our holding today also accords with the well-established common law
principle that severance damages "may be made for any diminution in the
value of [an owner's non-condemned land], as long as those damages were
directly caused by the taking itself and by the condemnor's use of the land
taken."
State v. Harvey Real Estate. 2002 UT 107, Tfll, 57 P.3d 1088 (alteration and first
emphasis in original, second emphasis added).
The defendant had the duty to demonstrate that it owned the claimed protected
property interest and that the interest had been taken or damaged.
Under article I, section 22, the takings analysis has two principal steps.
First, the claimant must demonstrate "some protectible interest in property."
Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1990). If the
claimant possesses a protectible property interest, the claimant must then
show that the interest has been "taken or damaged" by government action.
Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City. 918 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1996).
I. ADMIRAL BEVERAGE DOES NOT HAVE A PROTECTABLE
INTEREST IN THE FLOW OF TRAFFIC PAST ITS PROPERTY
Admiral Beverage has not challenged the view of Utah's courts that its alleged loss
of visibility is a loss of traffic flow past its commercial property. Defendant has failed to
demonstrate that it has a constitutionally protected interest in the flow of traffic on the
highway near its property. Absent such an interest, no taking has occurred under the Utah
Constitution.
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To enjoy the protections of article I, section 22, an alleged property
interest must be more "than a unilateral expectation of continued
privileges." We have declined to find a taking in situations where the
plaintiffs failed to prove a "vested legally enforceable interest." In contrast,
we have acknowledged the protectable interest one acquires when they have
obtained a "completed, consummated right for present or future
enjoyment."
Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corp., 2010 UT 37, f 19, 235 P.3d 730 (footnotes omitted).
Bingham involved a takings claim concerning groundwater. The plaintiffs had not
followed the legal steps to appropriate the groundwater under their property for their use.
Nevertheless, they claimed that the city, in using this water, had taken their property
rights in the water without compensation. In rejecting the plaintiffs5 takings claim, this
Court explained that:
Stripped to its essence, the Group's claimed interest in the water table
is analogous to the "unilateral expectation of continued privileges" that we
have held is insufficient to support a takings claim. Without having
lawfully appropriated this water, the Group lacked a claim of entitlement to
the continued presence of water in its soil. Without this degree of
entitlement, the Group's interest does not fall within the protections of
article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution.
IcL at f 30 (footnote omitted).
It did not matter what a willing buyer might have paid for the continued use of the
groundwater. Because the plaintiffs only had a unilateral expectation of continued
enjoyment of the groundwater, they could not state a takings claim.
"However, to create a protectable property interest, a contract must establish rights
more substantial in nature than a mere unilateral expectation of continued rights or
benefits." Bagford v. Ephraim City. 904 P.2d 1095,1099 (Utah 1995). In Bagford. this
9

Court held that a garbage collection company did not have a protectable property interest
in continuing to serve certain customers. Ephraim City passed a garbage ordinance
requiring all city residents to pay for city operated garbage collection, regardless of
whether they used the city service. Plaintiffs claimed that this constituted a taking of their
ongoing business with customers in the city. In rejecting this claim, this Court explained
that:
Their business in Ephraim City was based only on the expectation of being
able to continue doing business there, not on a legal right to do so. It
follows that their investment of money in the expectation that they would be
able to continue their business in Ephraim City indefinitely is not a
protectable property interest.
Id at 1100.
Admiral Beverage cannot state a takings claim unless it can show it had a
protectable property interest. But Utah has never recognized a claim for loss of visibility.
Neither the legislature nor this court has recognized a protected
property right in visibility of one's property from the roadway. As a result,
the court of appeals concluded that Arby's was not entitled to present
evidence of claimed damage to their property caused by a loss of visibility
of the property. We agree. In Utah, landowners do not have a protected
interest in the visibility of their property from an abutting road, even if part
of their land has been taken in the process.
In Utah State Road Commission v. Miya, we concluded that the
"rights of access, light, and air are easements appurtenant to the land of an
abutting owner on a street. We also concluded in Miya that "[a] property
owner has no property right to a free and unrestricted flow of traffic past his
premises, and any impairment or interference with this flow does not entitle
the owner to compensation." Similarly, a property owner has no
recognized property right to free and unrestricted visibility of his property
bypassing traffic, and an impairment of that visibility does not mandate
compensation.
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The speculative nature of the damages sought in a claim for loss of
visibility further supports this conclusion. As the court of appeals correctly
noted, a claim for loss of visibility is essentially a claim for compensation
for lost business profits. Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution
simply does not create a protectable property interest in the mere hope of
future sales from passing traffic.
Because property owners have no protectable property interest in
visibility, the trial court was correct in granting the motion in limine on this
issue, and the court of appeals was correct in affirming.
Ivers, 2007 UT 19 at ^[12-15 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
Ivers simply followed prior precedent on this issue. Utah has long rejected claims
by property owners to a vested interest in continued access to the motoring public. In
Robinett v. Price. 74 Utah 512, 280 P. 736 (1929), the plaintiffs commercial property
was separated from the business district of the City of Price by railroad tracks. The city
closed the road over the tracks that provided direct access to his property. The result was
that anyone trying to reach his property from the business district had to take a circuitous
route. He alleged that the fair market value of his property, and the rent he could charge,
was significantly reduced by the city's action.
Though the travel over Ninth street is somewhat more inconvenient in
going to and from plaintiffs property to Main street and to the business
portion of the city than was the former route enjoyed by him, and though
the value and the rental value of his property may have, as contended by
him, been decreased by such change of route, yet such inconvenience and
injury are not in kind and degree special entitling the plaintiff to
compensation for resulting loss or injury occasioned thereby.
280P.2dat737.
In State v. Rozzelle. 101 Utah 464,120 P.2d 276 (1941), a gasoline station on the
defendant's land had abutted the previous highway. The new highway could only be
11

reached indirectly from the gasoline station. The landowner sought damages for lost
profits for that portion of his property (including the gasoline station) that was not
condemned. The majority of the Court held that the landowner had not shown a causal
connection between the condemnation and the alleged lost profits. In his concurrence,
Justice Wolfe went further.
The respondents seek damages, not for any physical detriment to their
property because of a change in grade with a consequent loss of value for
the purposes for which suited, but damages due to a decrease in value for
the purposes of soliciting and catering to the public, the opportunity for
which has been greatly lessened by the removal of the road. I am in accord
with the principle laid down in the opinion to the effect that abutting owners
have no rights in the convenient accessability of the public to their place,
the loss of which would mean loss of business. Any losses resulting from
unreasonably cutting off their own access to their property or unreasonably
interfering with their light and air given by reason of their abutting on a
public highway are compensable. But not the loss of flow of traffic from the
street into their place of business. The law does not give them a vested right
in the business which travel along a public highway may have afforded
them.
120 P.2d at 278 (emphasis added).
Justice McDonough also concurred. "I also concur in what is said by Mr. Justice
Wolfe to the effect that diminution in value of the realty caused by the loss of the flow of
traffic to or past defendant's place of business is not compensable." Id.
Wolfe's concurrence was cited as the law of Utah by a unanimous court in Weber
Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Hislop. 12 Utah 2d 64, 362 P.2d 580, 581 (1961)
(claim by tavern owner for damages caused by loss of flow of traffic).
Appellant's argument assumes that a landowner has a property right
in the flow of traffic on a highway adjacent to his property. This is not so.
12

The owner of land abutting on a street or highway has no property or other
vested right in the flow of traffic on that street or highway and is not
entitled to compensation when that flow of traffic is diminished as a result
of eminent domain proceedings.
362 P.2d at 581 (footnote omitted). See also Utah Road Comm'n v. Hansen, 14 Utah 2d
305, 383 P.2d 917, 920 (1963) ("It is settled in this jurisdiction that the landowner has no
property right in the flow of traffic on a public highway.") (footnote omitted).
Establishment and regulation of traffic movement is a function of state police
powers, and the fact that 1-15 may bring traffic near the property does not create a vested
right. The government may direct the traffic elsewhere without a claim for loss of
property rights.
Nor does the right of ingress or egress to or from one's property include any
right in and to existing public traffic on the highway, or any right to have
such traffic pass by one's abutting property. The reason is that all traffic on
public highways is controlled by the police power of the State, and what the
police power may give an abutting property owner in the way of traffic on
the highway it may take away, and by any such diversion of traffic the State
and any of its agencies are not liable for any decrease of property values by
reason of such diversion of traffic
Hampton v. Rd. Comm'n. 21 Utah 2d 342,445 P.2d 708, 711 (1968) (quoting State
Highway Common v. Meier, 388 S.W.2d 855, 860 (Mo. 1965).
Admiral Beverage has failed to cite any Utah precedent that recognized a property
right in the continued flow of traffic past a landowner's property. Ivers properly relied
upon this Court's prior decisions to find that a landowner had no protectable property
interest in the flow of traffic under the name of a loss of visibility.
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Plaintiff has failed to distinguish between the police power, which is
used to regulate and the power of eminent domain, which is used to acquire
property from private ownership. A property owner has no property right to
a free and unrestricted flow of traffic past his premises, and any impairment
or interference with this flow does not entitle the owner to compensation.
Utah State Road Comm'n v. Miva. 526 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1974).
Miya and Hampton were followed by this Court in State v. Harvey, 2002 UT 107,
fl4, 57 P.3d 1088 (right of access does not include right to continued public traffic).
Ivers, following established Utah law, held again that there was no protectable interest in
the flow of traffic past a parcel of land. Without such a property right, defendant cannot
state a takings claim under the Utah Constitution.
II. IVERS'S EXPANSION OF THE APPURTENANT EASEMENT
OF VIEW SO AS TO BURDEN OTHER PROPERTIES SHOULD BE
OVERRULED
As the defendant acknowledges, this Court's ruling in Ivers "expanded the prior
law that limited severance damage awards to situations where the view-impairing
structure is built directly on the condemned land and causes damage to the remainder
property." Supplemental Brief of Defendant / Petitioner at 12. In doing so, Ivers
inappropriately expanded the appurtenant easement of view so that it burdened not only
the abutting road but all other parcels of property that might be part of the same road
construction project.
Ivers correctly stated the prior status of Utah law.
In Miya, Harvey Real Estate, and D'Ambrosio, we concluded that
when the state condemns a portion of land and builds a view-impairing
structure directly on that land, the damage to the remaining property is
14

recoverable. This is because when the condemned land is used for the
construction of the view-impairing structure, the damage to the remaining
property is clearly caused by the severance.
Ivers v. Utah Dep't of Transp.. 2007 UT 19, f20, 154 P.3d 802.
It then erred by expanding the appurtenant easement of view to apply not only to
obstructions build on the condemned property, but to any view-impairing structure built
as part of the same construction project so long as the condemned property was essential
to the completion of the project as a whole. Id. at f21. This alteration of Utah's law
should be overruled.
Where Ivers erred was in expanding the appurtenant easement of view so that it
burdened other property than the abutting roadway. Judge Roth's decision on the first
motions in limine (entered before Ivers) correctly sets out Utah's prior law. R. 499-500.
Severance damages were limited to those caused by the take itself or from
improvements built on the condemned portion of the property.
The general rule is that damages attributable to the taking of others'
property and the construction of improvements thereon are not
compensable. Such damages suffered generally by all the property owners
in the area are deemed consequential.
Severance damages are those caused by the taking of a portion of the
parcel of property where the taking or the construction of the improvement
on that part causes injury to that portion of the parcel not taken.
The damages sought by defendants were due to the construction of
the highway and its proximity to their residential property. These damages
were not occasioned by the taking of parcel 69:a and are not different in
nature from the damages suffered from all other property owners in the area
whose property was not taken. Such damages were originally identified by
defendants as consequential in nature. This characterization was correct.
Utah Dep't of Transp. v. D'Ambrosio. 743 P.2d 1220,1221-22 (Utah 1987).
15

Defendant is not entitled to severance damages for a loss of view caused by an
obstruction that was built on a different parcel of land. Unless he had some property right
to control that other parcel, the owner would be free to build any lawful structure thereon
regardless of how it might obstruct the view from the defendant's land. In Bd. ofEduc. v.
Croft, 373 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1962), this Court rejected a claim for damages to the
remaining property allegedly caused by construction of school where the school was not
built on that portion of plaintiffs' land that was condemned.
Our holding today also accords with the well-established common law
principle that severance damages "may be made for any diminution in the
value of [an owner's non-condemned land], as long as those damages were
directly caused by the taking itself and by the condemnor's use of the land
taken."
State v. Harvey, 2002 UT 107 at f 11 (alteration and first emphasis in original, second
emphasis added).
The court of appeals in Ivers correctly applied Utah law:
[B]ecause Arby's loss of view . . . was not caused by the
severance of its property or the construction of an
improvement thereon, it is not entitled to severance damages.
State v. Ivers, 2005 UT App 519, TJ24, 128 P.3d 74.
These statements are consistent with the doctrine of servient and dominant estates
because the rights of the adjacent landowner are only rights appurtenant and do not
restrict what the burdened landowner can do with his own property so long as the
easement appurtenant is not violated. If the Court reaches this issue, this portion of the
Ivers decision should be overruled as being contrary to Utah law.
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But this Court does not need to reach this issue. Even under Ivers, the defendant's
claims were properly rejected. It is undisputed that the defendant's property does not
abut 1-15. Defendant's property is divided and separated from 1-15 by 500 West, a street
owned by Salt Lake City. This physical condition existed both before and after the 1-15
reconstruction. As part of the 1-15 reconstruction project, Salt Lake City's 500 West was
moved by UDOT further to the west, partially on land taken from the defendant due to the
expansion of the freeway onto part of Salt Lake City's land. Under Utah law, the
defendant can not claim damages for loss of view caused by changes made to a public
road that his property did not abut.
Utah has long recognized that an owner of land that abuts a public road enjoys
rights of easement of access, air, light, and view to the public road. In Dooly Block v.
Salt Lake Rapid Transit 33 P. 229, 231 (Utah 1893), this Court explained that abutting
property owners had the right of access to the street "subject only to the ordinary use of
the same for the purposes of public travel, and that they are entitled to the use of said
street, free from unreasonable obstructions, as a means of access, light, and air to their
premises."
The appurtenant rights of air, light, and view discussed in Dooly Block and Utah
State Road Commission v. Miya. 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974) are companion to, and
derivative of, the easement for physical access. "The rights of access, light, and air are
easements appurtenant to the land of an abutting owner on a street; they constitute
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property rights forming part of the ownerfs estate." Miya, 526 P.2d at 928.l As such,
they create no right greater than the right to physical access. They consist of the right to
use the public street for access, light, air, and view. They impose no greater burden on
the public right of way than the servitude necessary to provide the right of access.
These rights are properly described as rights, or easements, appurtenant to property
that abuts a public street. Abut is defined as "[t]o reach; to touch. . . . No intervening
land." Black's Law Dictionary 11 (5th ed. 1979). To claim an appurtenant easement, a
landowner must meet two requirements. First, the land in question must abut the roadway
in question. Second, the roadway must be a public road. Okemo Mountain. Inc. v.
Ludlow. 762 A.2d 1219, 1225 (Vt. 2000).
Abutting owners have certain private rights which are not common
to the public generally, such as the rights of view, of light and air, and of
lateral support, but these rights are subordinate to the right of passage of
the public, and are subject to reasonable regulation and restriction.
An abutting owner has two distinct kinds of rights in a highway: a
public right which he or she enjoys in common with all other citizens, and
certain private rights which arise from his or her ownership of property
contiguous to the highway, and which are not common to the public
generally, and this is the case regardless of whether or not the fee of the
highway is in him or her. These rights are property of which he or she may
not be deprived without his or her consent, except on full compensation and
by due process of law.
39A C.J.S. Highways § 140 (Westlaw through June 2009) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted).

1

"An owner of land abutting on a street is also in possession of an easement of
view, which constitutes a property right which may not be taken without just
compensation." Id. at 929.
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These appurtenant easements apply only to the abutting roadway and not to any
other road or property. "This state has long recognized that a landowner owning property
abutting a public street possesses as appurtenant to his lot implied easements for light, air
and view over the public street. These easements extend to the full width of the street and
are independent of any fee interest in the street held by the landowner.55 Haeussler v.
Braun, 314 N.W.2d 4, 7 (Minn. 1981). The right of view does not pass beyond the public
roadway and cross out the other side. Neither does it travel laterally up and down the
highway. The right does not extend across the abutting roadway to burden private and
public property on the other side of the public street to guarantee a view over such
property. Utah's courts have regularly described the right as one of reasonable access to
and from the property to use the public road.
The interest protected simply entails the "right of ingress and egress to and
from . . . property and the abutting public highway." Harvey's property may
be accessed through both the new frontage road and Old Mountain Road;
consequently, its right of access has not been denied. The right does not
extend so far as to guarantee a property owner that his property will be
accessed through specific intersections or that the roads accessing his
property will be easily accessed from other thoroughfares.
State v. Harvey, 2002 UT 107 at f 14 (citation omitted).
This approach to the rights appurtenant is also incorporated into Utah Code Ann.
§ 72-1-102(11) (West 2004), which defines a limited-access facility as
a highway especially designated for through traffic, and over, from, or to
which neither owners nor occupants of abutting lands nor other persons
have any right or easement, or have only a limited right or easement of
access, light, air, or view.
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The courts of other states have also followed the general rule that a landowner
does not have appurtenant easements over the property of their neighbors. These
easements only apply to the public road that abuts their property.
As a general matter, a landowner cannot recover from a neighboring
landowner simply because he dislikes the use to which the second
landowner put his property. Thus, a landowner could not recover from his
neighbor just because the other had erected a building on his own property
which blocked the view from the first owner's land, or the visibility of the
first owner's land. The only way to prevent a neighbor from constructing a
building which would block one's view is to buy an easement of view. The
logical implication of this position is that a property owner has no right to
an unobstructed line of vision to his property from anywhere off of his
property, absent an easement of some sort.
8.960 Square Feet v. State. 806 P.2d 843, 845-46 (Alaska 1991) (citation and footnotes
omitted). See also Collinson v. John L. Scott, Inc., 778 P.2d 534, 537 (Wash. App. 1989)
("The general rule appears to be that a building or structure cannot be complained of as a
nuisance merely because it obstructs the view of neighboring property.").
It is undisputed that Admiral Beverage's property does not abut 1-15. It has at all
times abutted 500 West, not the freeway. The freeway was built, and remains today, on
property found on the far side of 500 West from the defendant's land. Defendant's
appurtenant easements pertain to 500 West and not to 1-15. Judge Faust's decision
correctly took this fact into consideration. "Defendant is able to assert claims for any
severance damages relating to abutment rights pertaining to being an adjoining landowner
to 500 West." R. 863. The district court correctly applied Utah law and was properly
affirmed by the court of appeals.
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CONCLUSION
Admiral Beverage does not have a protectable property interest in the flow of
traffic past its property (loss of visibility). Even under Ivers, defendant's appurtenant
easement of view has not been damaged. If it had been, the expanded right to view
created in Ivers should be overruled. For these reasons, the respondent urges this Court to
affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of October, 2010.

BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Plaintiff/ Respondent
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ADDENDUM "A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH
DEPARTMENT
TRANSPORTATION..

OF

Plaintiff,
vs.

ADMIRAL
BEVERAGE
CORPORATION (Assignee of Mark
Investment Trust); PARK CITY WEST
& ASSOCIATES; VALLEY BANK &
TRUST COMPANY nka BANK ONE,
UTAH; and VALLEY MORTGAGE
COMPANY nka UTAH INVESTMENT
COMPANY,

MEMORANDUM DECISION and
ORDER (Cross-Motions in Limine)

CONSOLIDATED:
Case No. 970905361 CD
Case No. 970905368CD

Defendants.
Judge Stephen L. Roth
UTAH
DEPARTMENT
TRANSPORTATION,

OF

Plaintiff,
vs.

ADMIRAL
BEVERAGE
CORPORATION,
Defendant.

Plaintiff Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") filed a Motion in Limine to which
defendant Admiral Beverage Corporation ("Admiral") responded with a cross-motion, Motion in
Limine of Defendant Admiral Beverage Corporation to Admit Evidence of All Factors That Affect
Fair Market Value ("Admiral's Motion in Limine"). While both motions are nominally focused on

the parties* competing views of the admissibility of basically the same evidence, they recognize that
the real issue is the scope of severance damages that may be awarded to defendants under Utah
condemnation law. The parties submitted memoranda supporting their own motions and opposing
their opponents, as well as reply memoranda. The court heard argument on the motions on June 28,
?005 where UDOT was represented by Randy S. Hunter, Assistant Attorney General, and Admiral
was represented by Rex E. Madsen (who argued) and Reed L. Martineau, Snow Christensen &
Martineau. The court gave leave 10 Admiral to submit a new survey in response to one submitted
by UDOT just before the hearing. That survey was provided to the court on August 31,2005, and
the matter was submitted for decision. Having considered the memoranda, affidavits and other
evidence submitted, along with the arguments of counsel, the court GRANTS UDOT's Motion in
Limine and DENIES Admiral's Motion in Limine, for the reasons set forth below.
DECISION
A.

Factual Background.
The relevant facts do not appear to be disputed in any material way. Admiral owns two

adjacent lots directly to the west of the I-15 freeway, bordering 500 West, which serves as a frontage
road in that area, running north and south between the Admiral lots and the west side of the freeway.
In connection with the 1-15 reconstruction project, the west side of the freeway in that area was
moved closer to the Admiral lots, requiring that the 500 West frontage road also be moved further
to the west and onto the east side of Admiral's property, resulting in the condemnation of what are
nowi

dentified by UDOT as parcels 109 and 110, which are the subject of these consolidated cases.
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Before reconstruction, the existing freeway lanes had an elevation about two feet higher than
the

surface of Admiral's property. The reconstructed freeway is elevated considerably higher, with

a portion of the f r e e l y wall reaching a heigh, of about 28 feet a, a point about six tnches outside
and to the west of the southeast comer of parcel 109, the former southeast comer of the Admiral
property, and about 62 fee, from the nearest point of Admiral's property remaining after the
A

,i„„ ' While 500 West was reconstructed on the taken parcels, no part of the rebuilt

freeway itself is located on thai property.
Based on an appraisal, UDOT deposited into court a total of $163,100 as payment of jus,
condemnation for the taking of parcels .09 and 1.0. Adrmral appears ,0 have only minimal
disagreement that the deposited amount is a fair value for the property taken, as valued onasquarefootage basis. The central issue is whether there are additional compensable severance damages to
,„e remainder of Admiral's property. Based on the reports of its own expert appraisal witnesses,
Admiral claims that the market valueofthe remaining property has been reduced by«(a)lossofair,
liinl,

view, visibility and aesthetics, and (b) increased fumes and dust from traffic .raveling on ,he

^constructed 1-15 freeway . . . . » Admiral's Memorandum in Support of i,s Motion in Limine ,o
Admit Evidence of All Factors That Affect Fair Market Value and in Opposition ,0 Plaintiffs

• AHmiral originally argued that a portion of the freeway wall at issue was actually bu.1t
• .• the
t, sou
t heas^corner
hcLtfomer „,
of pplcel 109. based on UDOT
that appeared
„,„,,„
^ engineering
^ drawings
^
^ ^to
u D o T
S

T1

t^Affidav oTKeith Hafen, a more de.ai.ed survey that showed the wall, a, ,s nearest

90

wn ™ v done which confirmed that the wall was omside of parcel 09, although four to f v
;„r"a,rcloses"point rather than six, a difference tha, is no, materia, to the tssues before the
court.
o-

Motion in Limine ("Admiral's Memorandum in Support") at 2. UDOT contends that these rights
are not compensable as severance damages under applicable law.
B.

Analysis,
The factors identified by Admiral's appraisers as damaging the remaining property seem to

fall into three categories: the loss of visibility and prominence of the remainder due to the size and
location of the new freeway structures; loss of air and light to, and view from, the remaining
property; and the increase in noise, dust, fumes and so on from increased traffic flow nearer to the
remainder than the prior freeway. The claim for Joss of visibility is the only subject addressed in
UDOT's Motion in Limine, but all of these factors are addressed in Admiral's Motion in Limine,
which is imposed in toto by UDOT. The loss of visibility issue is addressed separately as a matter
of first impression in Utah.
1.

Logs of Visibility.

There seems to be no dispute that reconstruction of the portion of LI 5 passing by the Admiral
property, which moved the freeway closer and significantly raised its grade, restricts the visibility
of the remainder parcels from passing vehicles in comparison with the prior freeway configuration.
The issue of whether reduced visibility is a compensable severance damage has not been directly
addressed by Utah appellate courts. Nevertheless, the court believes that analogous Utah case law
provides guidance in this area.
A long line of Utah cases has established the principle that the appurtenant rights of an owner
of abutting propenv do not include an interest in the iraffic flow from a public road or highway
passing by his property that justifies severance damages if reduced or taken away. In Hampton v.
State Road Commission, 445 P.2d 708 (Utah 1968), the court noted that "the right of ingress or
-4-

earess to or from one's property [does not] include anyrightin and to existing public traffic on the
highway, or any right to have such traffic pass by one's abutting property." Id. at 71L The court
explained:
The reason is that all traffic on public highways is controlled by the police power of
the State, and what the police power may give an abutting property owner in the way
of traffic on the highway it may take away, and by any such diversion of traffic the
State and any of its agencies are not liable for any decrease of property values by
reason of such diversion of traffic, because such damages are "'damnum absque
injuria'" or damage without legal injury.
Id. at 347. See also, Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Hislop, 362 P.2d 580, 581 (Utah
1961) ("The owner of land abutting on a street or highway has no property or other vested right in
the flow of traffic on that street or highway and is not entitled to compensation when that flow of
traffic is diminished as a result of eminent domain proceedings"); Utah State Road Commission v.
Miya, 526 P.2d 926,928 (Utah 1974) ("A property owner has no right to a free and unrestricted flow
of traffic past his premises, and any impairment or interference with this flow does not entitle the
owner to compensation/'); Utah Department ofTransportation v. Harvey Real Estate, 2002 UT107,
1114 (citing Miya and quoting Hampton for the principle stated above).
Here, a significant portion of Admiral's claimed severance is based on the reduction in
visibility from the reconstructed freeway when compared to its original configuration. The visibility
that was lost, under these circumstances, was necessarily a function of the passage of traffic. In other
words, the original visibility of the site resulted from the construction of the freeway by the State,
which exposed the Admiral property to the view of passing motorists who used the freeway as a
route of travel. Under existing law, if the State had moved the freeway route horizontally, to a
different location far enough from the Admiral property that it traffic no longer passed by it the
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deprivation of the passing traffic itself would not be a compensable injury. It is difficult to see howmoving the freeway vertically, so that traffic continues to pass by the property but without being able
to see it. results in an injury that is any different as a practical matter or that is legally distinctive in
anv meaningful way- The court therefore does not believe that diminishment of visibility from a
road or highway is any more compensable as severance damages than a more general diversion of
traffic flow would be.
Moreover, even if a right to visibility were found to be appurtenant to landowners abutting
a highway or road, the rights of abutting owners with respect to a freeway are significantly more
limited. 1-15 is. a "[l]imited-access facility," which is defined by statute as "a highway especially
designated for through traffic, and over, from, or to which neither owners nor occupants of abutting
lands nor any other persons have anyrightor easement, or have only a limited right or easement of
access, light, air, or view/' U.CA. § 72-1-102 (11). This definition suggests, among other things,
an intent to restrict the appurtenant rights of lands abutting freeways so as to limit the scope of
severance damages attributable to such rights.
Admiral relies in part on People v. Ricardi, 144 P.2d 799 (Cal. 1944), and subsequent
decisions following it, for the proposition that a landowner is entitled to severance damages for the
loss of the view of his property from a highway. The California Court of Appeals, however,
subsequently held that Ricardi's "right to a view" does not apply to freeways. The court upheld the
lower court's conclusion that an owner "has no legal right to a view of his property from the
freeway:
A freeway is unlike a highway. An abutter/1 andowner has a right to a view from a
public road or highway. However, while the purpose of a highway is to provide
landowners with abutter'srights,the purpose of a freeway is to eliminate those rights.
-6-

People « rei Depormen, of Transport

, Wilson, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 52, 55 (Cal.App. 1994)

.citation .c Ricardi -mine* The court no.ed ,ha, .he purpose of roads or highways is .0 allow
access from abutting private property and ,0 allow travelers along ,he road o, highway »,o view a
business, drive into fc pa™nize it, and reenter the highway" bu, .ha. "[s]uch purposes are
antagonistic .o ,he pu^ose of a freeway," which is designed .0 •"preven, jus, tha, sort of thing.'"
U. (ci.a.ions omitted)- The court wen. on .0 discuss a California s.a.u.e similar in import .0 Utah's:
p„r tha, reason. S,ree,s ond Highway Code seaion 23.5 provides thai owners of
2 , in lands .0 a freeway have limited or norightof access .0 or from therr abutting
land" Obviously a freeway restricts rights of access and related nghts such as the
right to a view.
Jd
Therefore, even if the court were inclined tofindarightto a view of one's abutting property
from a road or highway under Utah law, the court concludes that a landowner "has no legal right to
a view of his property from the freeway."
2.

OtherJ2amages,

Admiral also claims it is entitled to severance damages for "loss of air, light, view, visibility
and aesthetics." a bundle of rights that may include, bu, goes beyond, the right to a view from the
freeway, as well as for "increased fumes and dust from traffic traveling on the reconstructed 1-15
freeway/' The court concludes that Utah law does not allow recovery for such damages under the
circumstances of these consolidated cases.
The claimed damages appear to arise either from the elevation of the grade of the freeway
or from increased traffic due to the freeway improvements. Neither the construction of the elevated
ramp or the reconstruction of the freeway itself, however, occurred on Admiral's property; the only
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improvement constructed on Admiral's property was the relocation of the 500 West frontage road.
Utah cases have been consistent in holding that severance damages are limited to those caused by
the taking itself or attributable to improvements constructed on the taken property. The court in
Miya, infindingcompensable the loss of view from a remainder property caused by construction of
a highway highway structure, noted that "the loss of view occasioned by a proposed public structure
to be erected, in part at least, upon a parcel of property taken by condemnation from a unit" was a
factor to be taken into account in determining severance damages. Miya, 526 P.2d at 929 (emphasis
added).
This precept was emphasized in Utah Dep 7 ofTransportation v. D 'A mbrosio, 743 P.2d 1220
(Utah 1987), where the state took a private road to two residences, which it paved and made public
in connection with a highway extension. The Court rejected the landowners' claim that they were
entitled to severance damages from construction of the highway:
The general rule is that damages attributable to the taking of others' property and the
construction of improvements thereon are not compensable. Such damages suffered
generally by all the property owners in the area are deemed consequential.
Severance damages are those caused by the taking of a portion of the parcel of
property where the taking or the construction of the improvement on that part causes
injury to that portion of the parcel not taken.
Id at 1221-22 (emphasis in the original).
The court reemphasized its D 'Ambrosio holding in Harvey Real Estate, supra, an appeal of
a trial court's grant of the state's motion in limine excluding certain severance damage evidence.
In Harvey, the landowner sought severance damages for the diminution in value of its remainder
property resulting from the closure of an intersection as part of a road project for which a portion of
its land was taken. Similar to an argument Admiral makes here, the owner contended that the
-8-

i n t e r sectionclosure^asmadeposs^

UT 107, 112. Harvey asserted that limiting severance damages to only those resulting from
movements constructed at least in part on the portion of the property taken conflicted with the
broad language of U.CA. § 78-34-10(2), which provides for assessment of damages to a remainder
from the taking of a portion of the property and from <Hhe construction of the improvement in the
manner proposed by the plaintiff [condemning authority]." The court disagreed:
Action 78-34-10 gives a landowner the right to present evidence of damages caused
hv the construction of the improvement made on the severed property, t does not
dven the landowner the right to present evidence of damages caused by other facets
given
of the construction project.
* *

*

We held essentially the same in Utah Department transportation v. D^rnbroso
^ P2d 1220,1222 (Utah 1987), although we did not reference section 78o4-10(2).
m r e we stated that "severance damages are those caused by the taking of a portion
™Z Zed of property where the taking or the construction ojthe improvement on
Itoaruau^ry
'to that portion of the property not taken." (Emphasis added.
Ou ho ding today also accords with the well-established common law pnncple that
leranc daUges
severance:
dam g "mayy be made for any diminution
^
^in the value
^ ^ of [an owner s
by {he

/akmg

§368(1996) (emphasis added)
Id. at 1110-11 (interpolations a " d ™ P h a s i s i n , h e

0ri8ina1, SOnK C f t a , i n S 0 m i

°

"ed)'

B e court therefore concludes that damages resulting from construction of the elevated ramp
just

outside the taken parcels, as well as damages from the reconfiguration of the freeway as par. of

.nereconstructionprcject are no, compensate as severance damages underUtah lav,, disappears
,„ inCude evidence related to ali of "the components of severance damages" ,ha, were ^aken into
account" by Admiral's expert appraisers and enumerated a, paragraph 7 of the Affidavit of Robe*
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A. Steele and paragraph 7 of the Affidavit of John C. Brown (Exhibits A and B, respectively, to
Admiral's Memorandum in Support), except for "loss of parking."2
ORDER
It is therefore ORDERED that UDOT's Motion in Limine is GRANTED, and Admiral's
Motion in Limine to Admit Evidence of All Factors That Affect Fair Market Value is DENIED.
DATED this j5/_ day of October, 2005.

Stephen L. Roth
i^°
DISTRICT JUDGE $

2

The facts of this case illustrate the sometimes arbitrary nature of the rule that the court has
relied on in making its decision here. Without so finding, it is certainly possible that the court's
decision would have been significantly different if the offending elevated freeway ramp had been
built six inches within, rather than six inches outside, the condemned parcel 109. In this regard
Admiral has advanced an argument that has special appeal given the harsh result the difference of
a matter of inches may produce. That argument proposes that if a taking is part of an integrated
project (which Admiral argues is the case here), the landowner should be entitled to compensation
for damages resulting from specific improvements related to the purpose of the taking and causing
specific injury to the remainder, even if they were not constructed within the immediate boundaries
of the take. See Admiral Beverage Corporation's Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion in
Limine ..., at 6-JO. This approach recognizes that the actual reduction in value of the remainder
from the improvement, as a practical matter, may be no different when it is located just within or just
outside of the taken parcel.
The court believes, however, that the repeated (and apparently unequivocal) holdings of the
Utah Supreme Court, as addressed above, constrain it from seriously considering such an approach
at this level because it would involve a depanure from current law. In this regard, the appellate
courts are better equipped to identify, analyze and resolve the competing public and private interests,
as well as the legal complications, that would be implicated in such a change, in approach to
severance damages. The resolution of these issues must therefore be left to some future appeal
-10-
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I N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
I N AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO. 970905361
970905368
(Consolidated)

Plaintiff/

vs.

ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION
(ASSIGNEE OF MARK INVESTMENT
COMPANY) ; PARK CITY WEST &
ASSOCIATES; VALLEY BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, nka BANK ONE, UTAH;
VALLEY MORTGAGE COMPANY, nka
UTAH INVESTMENT COMPANY,
Defendants.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION,
Defendant.

UDOT'$ Motions in Limine on the issue of view and visibility and
concerning Jerry R. Weber's testimony on the subject of severance damages
caused by loss of view and visibility was heard by the Court on December
18

2007/ at 10:00 a.m.

After hearing arguments thereon, review of the

pleadinas and a specific review of the Decision dated October 31st, 2005
issued by Judge Both in this case,
Limine.

che Court grants UDOT' s Motions in

The Court also refers the parties to Judge Roth's decision and

adopts the same here.
Defendant is able to assert claims for any severance damages
relating to abutment rights pertaining to being an adjoining landowner
to 500 West*
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of xhe Court.
Dated this 24zn day of December, 2007.

ROBERT P. FAUST
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby

certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the

no Minute Entry, to the following, this
foregoing

_day of December,

2007:

Randy S. H u n t e r
Barbara I s h i m a t s u
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y s General
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake C i t y , ^tah 84114-0857
Reed L. Martineau
Korey D. Rasmussen
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange P l a c e , Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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IN T H E DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, :
Plaintiff/
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vs.
ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION
(ASSIGNEE OF HARK INVESTMENT
COMPANY) ; PARK CITY WEST &
ASSOCIATES; VALLEY BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, n k a BANK ONE, UTAH;
VALLEY MORTGAGE COMPANY, n k a
UTAH INVESTMENT COMPANY,
Defendants-

(Consolidated)

;
:
2

2

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff/
vs.

ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION,
Defendant-

UDOT's Motion

in Limine on

the issue of view and visibility

(concerning Jerry R. Weber's testimony on the subject of severance
damages caused by loss of view and visibility) was heard by the Court on
December 18, 2007, at 10:00 a.m. After hearing arguments thereon, review
of the pleadings

and a specific review of the Decision dated October 31,

UDOT V. ADMIRAL*
_ ^on
BEVERAGE CORP.
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2005 issued by Judge Roth in this case, the Court grants UDOT's Motion
in Limine.

The Court refers the parties to Judge Roth's decision and

adopts the same here.
Defendant

is able to assert claims for any severance damages

elating to abutment rights pertaining to being an adjoining landowner
to 500 West.
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court.
Dated this 24th day of December, 2007.

ROBERT P. FAUST
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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